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Abstract 
 
The development of high-speed rail (HSR) has had a notable impact on 
modal market shares on the routes on which its services have been 
implemented. The aim of this study is to analyse whether the HSR 
expansion in Italy has led to a modal shift from motorway to HSR. We 
empirically test i) whether HSR openings adjacent to motorway sectors have 
reduced the total km travelled by light vehicles on these sectors during the 
period 2001-2017; and ii) whether this reduction has been persistent or even 
more evident after the opening of on-track competition between two HSR 
operators. To do so, we carried out a generalized difference-in-differences 
estimation, using a unique panel dataset that exploits the heterogeneous 
traffic data within all tolled motorway sectors in a quasi-experimental setting. 
Our findings reveal that neither HSR openings nor the opening of on-track 
competition led to a modal shift from motorway to HSR services, as the two 
transport modes are non-competing. Conversely, both phenomena had a 
slightly positive impact on motorway traffic. The extent to which HSR 
demand could be the result of a modal shift from motorways is a relevant 
issue in any cost-benefit analysis of HSR investments. 
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1. Introduction
The spread of the railroads has, historically, been one of the main deter-
minants of the urbanization and economic growth of many countries, including
the United States (Donaldson and Hornbeck, 2016), India (Donaldson, 2018),
Sweden (Berger and Enflo, 2017), Switzerland (Bu¨chel and Kyburz, 2018), and,5
more recently, China (Diao, 2018; Yu et al., 2018). In its efforts to achieve bet-
ter social inclusion, cohesion and accessibility, the development of high-speed
rail (HSR) has been one of the central features of the European Union’s re-
cent transport infrastructure policy (Vickerman, 1997). Indeed, since the end of
the twentieth century, many European countries have implemented huge HSR10
programmes. Following the opening of the pioneering TGV Paris–Lyon line in
France, other mature high-speed (HS) services have been constructed in Spain
(AVE), Germany (ICE), and Italy (TAV)1, each country adopting its own spe-
cific model in terms of speed, network integration, type of services and regula-
tory characteristics (Campos and De Rus, 2009; Perl and Goetz, 2015).15
The rationale underpinning the introduction of HSR has also differed across
countries. In some cases, the objective was simply to reduce the travel time be-
tween city-pairs (Catalani, 2006), in others it was presented as a green solution
aimed at limiting the negative environmental impact of air and road transport
(Givoni et al., 2009), while in others it was means to address problems of ca-20
pacity restriction along certain corridors and to facilitate freight transportation
(Albalate and Bel, 2012). Each of these objectives has received the support of
the European Commission, which in 2011 set specific targets for the develop-
ment of the HS network, including the tripling of its length by 2030 so as to
achieve a 50% shift in medium-distance intercity passenger and freight journeys25
from road to rail by 2050 (European Commission, 2011). This last objective
has special relevance in Italy given the country’s extremely low share of rail
traffic: in 2007 rail journeys accounted for just 5% of all passenger transit,
while trains carried just 12% of the nation’s freight (RFI, 2007). Hence, un-
der the Trans-European Networks for Transport (TEN-T) programme, between30
2000 and 2017, the European Union provided 23.7 billion euros in grants to co-
finance HSR infrastructure investments across the Member States (European
Court of Auditors, 2018).
Today, HSR services have transformed modal market shares on the routes
on which they have been implemented both by generating new demand and by35
replacing the demand for other modes of transport (A´lvarez-SanJaime et al.,
2015). Yet, after more than 50 years of experience of operating HSR around
the world, relatively little is known about the nature of its demand (Givoni
and Dobruszkes, 2013). Over this period, a substantial body of research has
been published on different aspects of HSR, but the majority of it has fo-40
cused on inter-modal competition between HSR and air services, especially on
1At the end of 2017, in the European Union, there were 9 067 km of HS lines and 1 671 km
under construction.
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long point-to-point links, such as the Paris–Lyon (Bonnafous, 1987), Madrid–
Barcelona (Roma´n et al., 2007), Madrid–Seville (Jime´nez and Betancor, 2012),
and London–Paris (Behrens and Pels, 2012) city-pairs. Indeed, studies examin-
ing the impact of HRS links on shorter routes, where the car is the competitive45
means of transport, are, to the authors knowledge, relatively scarce. Yet, be-
cause road traffic reduction is one of the key drivers offsetting HSR investments,
we seek to fill this gap by analysing whether the HSR expansion in Italy has led
to a modal shift from its motorways to HSR services in a quasi-experimental
setting. To do so, we empirically test, first, whether HSR openings adjacent to50
motorway sectors have reduced the total km travelled by light vehicles on these
sectors during the period 2001-2017; and, second, whether this reduction has
been persistent or even more evident after the opening of on-track competition
on some adjacent HS and conventional lines between the incumbent Trenitalia
and the new operator Nuovo Trasporto Viaggiatori (NTV), which entered the55
HS passenger market in 2012.
This second question is an additional issue of interest in analysing the Italian
scenario because it represents the first instance of competition between nonsub-
sidized HSR operators using the same infrastructure and the same market2.
Competition provided more HS capacity and forced Trenitalia to reduce its60
average fares (Bergantino, 2015). Moreover, bearing in mind that HSR has re-
duced the daily commuting travel time in medium and large metropolitan areas
by 20-40%, the Italian HSR competes not only with air transport, but also with
the car (Cascetta et al., 2011).
We should stress that we exclude the total km travelled by heavy vehicles65
from our analysis because, although the Italian HSR network was ultimately
conceived as a mixed high-speed model equipped with numerous interconnec-
tions and line characteristics that would theoretically allow its use by dedicated
HS freight trains, to date, not a single freight train has used the new lines (Beria
and Grimaldi, 2017).70
The novelty of this paper lies in the fact that we carry out a counterfactual
analysis using a unique 17-year panel dataset. This allows us to control for
many unobservable confounding factors and to exploit the heterogeneous traffic
data within all tolled motorway sectors3 through a generalized difference-in-
differences estimation. Considering the difficulties in forecasting rail project75
demand (Flyvbjerg et al., 2005; Flyvbjerg, 2007), our contribution seeks to
understand the extent to which HSR demand could result from a modal shift
2On 1 June 2000, the two main divisions of the Italian railway company, infrastructure
and services, were separated. Infrastructure management was assigned to Rete Ferroviaria
Italiana (RFI), while passenger services were assigned to Trenitalia. Both are subsidiaries of
Ferrovie dello Stato Italiane (FSI) and entirely publicly owned. The liberalisation process
started in 2003, when the Italian Government implemented the European Directives on rail
competition (2001/12/CE, 2001/13/CE, and 2001/14/CE) into the Decreto Legislativo n.188
of 8 July 2003.
3We refer to those motorway sectors managed by highway concession companies, which rep-
resent almost 87% of the national network. Traffic data for the remaining toll-free motorway
sectors are not available. See Section 2.1 for further details.
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from motorways in order to provide additional evidence for estimating the en-
vironmental impact of introducing HSR services (De Rus and Nombela, 2007;
De Rus, 2011), which is clearly a relevant issue in any cost-benefit analysis of80
HSR investments.
Our findings reveal that neither HSR openings nor the opening of on-track
competition led to a modal shift from motorway to HSR services, as the two
transport modes are non-competing. Conversely, both phenomena had a slightly
positive impact on motorway traffic. Our evidence is corroborated by a set of85
robustness checks that deviate from baseline models, including an investigation
of the timing of the effects and placebo regressions.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a
brief history of the motorway and HSR networks in Italy and we review the
literature. In Section 3, we describe our methodological approach and data.90
In Section 4, we present our results, followed, in Section 5, by our robustness
checks. Section 6 critically discusses our findings and Section 7 concludes.
2. Motorway and HSR networks in Italy
2.1. History of the projects
Italian motorways underwent a massive expansion in the 1960s and ‘70s,95
coinciding with a period of sustained growth and the mass diffusion of cars. At
the end of 1974, the Italian network was more than twice the size of that of
France and three times that of the UK, and by 1980 it had reached 5 900 km
(Ragazzi, 2006). Since that date, the network’s length has barely increased:
in 2017 the total length constituted 6 003 km of tolled motorway sectors under100
concession to 25 private, public, or mixed capital companies, while 939 km
of toll-free motorway sectors were managed by ANAS, a government-owned
company under the control of the Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport
(AISCAT, 2017).
Italy’s first HS service was launched in 1992 between Florence and Rome,105
with the so-called Direttissima, which allowed the 254 km between the two
cities to be covered in about two hours. The development of a high-speed/high-
capacity network (in Italian, alta velocita`/alta capacita` or AV/AC) was first
conceived during the early ‘90s as an independent system from the rest of the
existing network and accessible to light HS rolling stock only (Albalate and110
Bel, 2012). In 1996, however, the nature of the project changed and it became a
mixed high-speed and freight line, including many interconnections with existing
conventional lines and capable of hosting freight trains (RFI, 2007).
The Turin–Salerno axis, which took a decade to construct (completed in
2009) and which allowed trains to travel at speeds of 250-300 km/h, provided115
faster connections between the cities making up what can be considered Italy’s
“backbone” (i.e., Turin, Milan, Bologna, Florence, Rome, Naples and Salerno).
The sections at either end of the Milan–Venice axis (i.e., Milan–Brescia and
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Figure 1: Schematisation of the mixed high-speed model used in Italy
(a) Frecciarossa and Italo (b) Frecciargento and Italo (c) Frecciabianca
Source: Beria et al. (2018)
Padua–Venice) were completed in 2016 and operated services at speeds of 200-
300 km/h, while the upgrading of the Verona–Bologna line was inaugurated in120
2009, raising its speed to 200 km/h.
To date, the national network comprises more than 1 000 km of HS lines4 (see
Appendix Tables A and B for the timeline of opening dates), while the supply
model adopted by its two operators is a mixed high-speed model (schematised
in Figure 1), in which Frecciarossa and Italo trains generally operate only on125
dedicated tracks that can reach speeds of 300 km/h (fully high-speed services),
Frecciargento (and also Italo) trains operate at a maximum of 250 km/h on
HS lines where connections with the conventional infrastructure are available
(mixed high-speed and conventional services), while Frecciabianca trains operate
on conventional lines only (fully conventional services)5.130
2.2. Previous evaluations
Leaving to one side the large number of cost-benefit analyses made of HSR,
the introduction of HSR services has primarily encouraged studies of the inter-
modal competition between air and rail, stimulated by such questions as airport
congestion (Fageda and Flores-Fillol, 2016) and the negative environmental im-135
pact of air transport (Givoni, 2007). Likewise, the liberalisation of the rail
market has resulted in several studies that focus on the intra-modal competi-
tion between rail operators, particularly in the Italian context. The literature
examining the competition between car and rail, on the other hand, is very
scant.140
Limiting our discussion on air-rail competition to a selection of the most
relevant studies (many more exist), Bergantino and Capozza (2015) and Mart´ın
and Nombela (2007) found that investment in rail infrastructure induces down-
ward pressure on competing airline fares and leads to a significant modal shift
4Other HSR projects, such as the central section of the Milan–Venice axis, the Genoa–
Milan link, the Naples–Bari link, the Palermo–Messina–Catania link, and three important
Alpine lines are under construction or under discussion as regards their redefinition (MEF,
2016, 2017).
5Frecciarossa, Frecciargento, and Frecciabianca are the commercial names of Trenitalia’s
long-distance market services (“le Frecce”), while Italo is the commercial name adopted by
NTV trains.
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towards HSR services. Other studies have explored the reaction of airline fares145
to rail travel time and airport accessibility both theoretically (Yang and Zhang,
2012) and empirically (Capozza, 2016), finding that airlines tend to set lower
fares as rail speed increases. Further, by focusing on the evolution of supply
rather than demand, Dobruszkes (2011) and Jime´nez and Betancor (2012) pro-
vided additional evidence that new HSR connections have reduced the number150
of air transport operations. In contrast with these studies, Givoni and Banis-
ter (2006) and Albalate et al. (2015) considered the potential for cooperation
rather than competition between the two transportation modes. They found
that, when economically convenient, airlines use HSR links as additional spokes
in their network of services from a hub airport to complement and substitute155
existing aircraft services.
Following the appearance of intra-modal competition in the HSR sector,
Bergantino et al. (2015) analysed how the entry of NTV has fostered competi-
tion not only with the airlines but also with the former incumbent Trenitalia.
By collecting actual fare data on three HS service routes (Rome to Milan, Turin160
and Venice) plus two air routes between Milan and Rome, the authors found,
first, that on the Rome–Milan link the rail market share increased from 36% in
2008 to 68% in 2012 (while the airline market share fell from 51 to 26% in the
same period); and, second, that Trenitalia’s fares were 29-34% higher than those
of its competitor. However, direct competition between the two operators led to165
an average fare reduction of 31% in one year and 34% over two years, allowing
passengers with less willingness to pay to access HSR services (Cascetta and
Coppola, 2014, 2015). Consistent with this, Beria et al. (2016) showed that be-
tween September 2013 and December 2014 the incumbent reduced its economy
class prices by about 15% on the Milan–Ancona route.170
Among the few studies that have examined the effect of HSR expansion
on car-rail mode substitution, Gonza´lez-Savignat (2004) designed a discrete
choice model to evaluate, ex-ante, the impact of the future HSR on current
road users in the Madrid–Barcelona corridor. She identified that HSR would
become a more competitive alternative for business car travellers, as a 10%175
increase in rail travel time would lead to a 9.2% reduction in their probability of
choosing HSR. In the case of ex-post evaluations, Givoni and Dobruszkes (2013)
provided a comprehensive international review by collecting results from studies
analysing different markets. They conclude that the reduction in the number of
car passengers (due to the introduction of HSR) on the routes examined is in the180
order of 10-20%. However, in the Madrid–Seville link, car passengers increased
by 23% after HSR services begun (European Commission, 1998). Likewise, on
Korean and Taiwanese routes, road transport retained high market shares after
the introduction of HSR services (Cho and Chung, 2008; Cheng, 2010).
In the case of Italy, Cascetta et al. (2011) explored user behaviour on the185
multimodal Rome–Naples link by using a revealed preference survey carried out
in March 2008. They found that the percentages of HSR users that actually
used the motorway before the HSR was inaugurated were just 7.8% on weekdays,
12.4% on Saturdays, and 14.4% on Sundays. Indeed, the highest percentage of
HSR users were already train users. In a study of the whole area influenced190
6
by HS lines, Cascetta and Coppola (2015) analysed data gathered by means of
on-board counts on HS trains, highways and domestic flights, between 2009 and
2013. The authors concluded that HSR had a direct impact on the modal split
of long distance travel demand and showed that total HSR demand increased by
81% during the period of study, while the variation in domestic travel demand195
by air and highway were substantially different if observed within the HSR
catchment area (-29 and -19%, respectively) with respect to their national trends
(-7 and -10%, respectively). Moreover, they estimated a broader effect in terms
of modal share in the core area: from 25 to 44% for HS services at the expense
of airlines (from 10 to 7%) and highways (from 57 to 45%).200
However, it should be noted that the above studies are heavily influenced by
route-specific characteristics and are conducted over relatively short time spans.
Bearing in mind the difficulty in discerning the impact of HSR expansion on car-
rail mode substitution from the general trend increase in demand for car travel
(Goodwin and Van Dender, 2013), the study we report here seeks to overcome205
these limitations by taking into consideration a longer time-span of analysis
and by exploiting heterogeneous traffic data within a sizeable set of different
motorway sectors.
3. Empirical analysis
3.1. Methodology and data210
The objective of this study is to empirically test the impact of i) HSR open-
ings and ii) the opening of on-track competition on the total km travelled by
light vehicles on adjacent motorway sectors. For this purpose, we collected data
for 51 tolled motorway sectors over the period 2001-2017, providing us with a
final sample of 867 observations. Then, we estimate the following semi-log panel
equations:
log(V ehicles−Kmit) = β0 + β1HSROpeningit + β2V ehiclesit
+ β3GDPit + β4Airport sizeit + β5Sector lengthit
+ β6Tollit + β7Fuelt + αi + δt + it
(1)
log(V ehicles−Kmit) = β0 + β1HSRCompetitionit + β2V ehiclesit
+ β3GDPit + β4Airport sizeit + β5Sector lengthit
+ β6Tollit + β7Fuelt + αi + δt + it
(2)
where the dependent variable in both equations is the logarithm of the total km
travelled by light vehicles6 (V ehicles −Kmit) on motorway sector i in year t.
The main explanatory variables are:
6Technically, light vehicles are motorcycles and two-axle vehicles with a height above the
ground, at the front axle, lower than 1.30 meters.
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• HSROpeningit (Equation 1): continuous variable that takes values between 0
and 1 depending on whether a full or partial HS line was opened adjacent to215
a motorway sector i in year t. It is calculated as the ratio between the km of
HSR in operation and the total HSR length, once completed.
• HSRCompetitionit (Equation 2): continuous variable that takes values between
0 and 1 depending on whether on-track competition between the incumbent
and the new operator started on a full or partial HS or conventional line220
adjacent to a motorway sector i in year t. It is calculated as the ratio between
the km of line under competition and its total length.
In both equations, the control variables are:
• V ehiclesit: light vehicles per capita calculated as the ratio between the num-
ber of light vehicles and population of municipalities located within a highway225
catchment area, i.e., within a 15-km arc distance from exits of a motorway
sector i in year t (CERTeT-Bocconi, 2006; Percoco, 2015). Since we cannot
observe solely the percentage of km travelled by light vehicles that covered
the whole route (i.e., those km travelled by long-distance passengers who
are more willing to evaluate HS trains as an alternative mode of transport),230
this variable aims at capturing an approximation of the impact of commuters
living in areas with high highway accessibility on the total km travelled.
• GDPit: weighted average of gross domestic product per capita (in thousands
of euros) in the regions of transit for a motorway sector i in year t (weights are
based on the percentage of km of motorway sector located in each region).235
This variable is a proxy of the economic activity surrounding the highway
area.
• Airport sizeit: passengers (in millions) carried by domestic flights departing
from airports located within a 50-km arc distance from exits of a motorway
sector i in year t, which is a standard size of an airport’s catchment area240
(Lieshout, 2012; Suau-Sanchez et al., 2014). This variable is a proxy of the
competitive transport sector surrounding the highway area.
• Sector lengthit: length (in km) of a motorway sector i in year t.
• Tollit: revenues per km travelled (in euro cents) as earned by the highway
concession company of a motorway sector i in year t calculated as the ratio245
between total revenues and total km travelled by vehicles on that sector.
Note that motorway sectors managed by the same concessionaire have the
same Toll value. This variable is a proxy of toll fare.
• Fuelt: weighted average cost of fuel (in euro cents) in year t calculated as the
average national cost of gasoline, diesel, and LPG weighted by the percentage250
of national light vehicles powered by the three different fuel types.
• αi, δt: motorway sector and year fixed effects.
Heteroskedasticity – and autocorrelation – consistent standard errors it are
clustered at the highway level, because some motorway sectors belong to the
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same highway. V ehicles−Km, Sector length, and Toll data were obtained from255
AISCAT (Associazione Italiana Societa` Concessionarie Autostrade e Trafori,
the concessionaires’ association). HSROpening and HSRCompetition data are
based on Bergantino et al. (2015), Beria et al. (2018), and taken from RFI
and NTV websites, and the operators’ financial statements. Data for V ehicles,
i.e., the number of light vehicles and population at municipality level, were260
obtained from ACI (Automobile Club d’Italia) and ISTAT (Istituto Nazionale di
Statistica), respectively, while municipalities located within a 15-km arc distance
from motorway exits were identified from the Automap website. GDP data were
also obtained from ISTAT, while Airport size data were provided by Eurostat.
Finally, data for Fuel, i.e., the average cost of gasoline, diesel, LPG, and the265
relative number of light vehicles at national level, were obtained from MiSE
(Ministero dello sviluppo economico) and ACI7.
It should be noted that to avoid an overly unbalanced panel dataset, we ex-
cluded from our dataset A33 Asti–Cuneo, A35 Milano–Brescia, A58 Tangenziale
esterna di Milano, and A36 Pedemontana Lombarda motorway sectors because270
they started their operations at the end of our period of analysis (in 2008, 2014,
2015, and 2016, respectively); that is, after the opening of several HSR sections.
Likewise we also excluded T1 Traforo del Monte Bianco, T2 Traforo del Gran
S. Bernardo, and T4 Traforo del Fre´jus Alpine tunnels because their charac-
teristics (e.g., traffic, length, and toll fare) are very different from those of the275
other motorway sectors. Finally, we excluded the A1 Firenze–Roma motorway
sector because the competitive HS line connecting the two cities had been in
operation before 1992.
The rationale for using HSROpening as our treatment variable is the fact that
it can capture any degree of competition between motorway and HSR because280
both transport modes connect the same city-pairs. The only exception is the
Verona–Bologna link where the motorway sector connects the two cities passing
through Modena.
It is worth noting that unlike previous studies that opted to measure the ef-
fect of intra-modal competition in terms of market shares, our HSRCompetition285
treatment variable considers the competition between HSR operators as a mea-
sure of augmented supply at lower fares. Indeed, although NTV ’s market pene-
tration has been especially rapid8, Trenitalia also reacted by increasing both its
capacity and demand9. The literature attributes this marked increase in passen-
7ACI light vehicle data, at both municipality and national levels, are missing for the
year 2001; therefore, they have been considered the same as those for 2002. RFI web-
site is http://www.rfi.it/rfi/LINEE-STAZIONI-TERRITORIO. NTV website is https://
italospa.italotreno.it/societa/la-storia/cinque-anni-di-italo.html. Automap web-
site is https://www.automap.it/.
8NTV passengers rose from 2 million in 2012 to 12.8 million in 2017. In 2013, NTV held
the 25% of the HS market share (Bergantino et al., 2015; Nuovo Trasporto Viaggiatori, 2017).
9For instance, on the Milan–Rome–Naples line, the supply of HS Trenitalia services rose
from 71 daily departures in 2009 to 89 in 2012 (Cascetta and Coppola, 2014). On its commer-
cial long-distance services, Trenitalia passengers rose from 18.7 million in 2010 to 45 million
in 2014 (Beria and Grimaldi, 2011; Dell’Alba and Velardi, 2015).
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ger numbers to the maturity of the HSR network as well as to the competition290
effects (Cascetta and Coppola, 2015). Following the entry of the new operator,
travellers enjoyed not only an average reduction in HS fares (as discussed in Sec-
tion 2.2) but also a differentiation of tariffs (e.g., from simple 1st and 2nd classes
to the Executive, Business, Premium, and Standard classes), a differentiation of
prices (e.g., Base, Economy, and Super-Economy prices), new stations of origin295
and destination (e.g., Rome Tiburtina and Milan Porta Garibaldi secondary
stations), and a better quality of ancillary services (e.g., Wi-Fi and agreements
with local tourist attractions). Since we can reasonably expect that all these
changes favoured travellers with a low willingness to pay, the coefficient asso-
ciated with HSRCompetition seeks to capture whether on-track competition led300
to a stronger modal shift from motorway to HSR services.
Finally, it could be argued that the non-random route placement of HSR
might bias our estimates. In relation to this issue, we can plausibly assume
that, conditional on the controls and fixed effects in our quasi-experimental
setting, HSROpening and HSRCompetition are exogenous with respect to the305
total km travelled by light vehicles on the adjacent motorway sectors.
One reason for this is that the decision was taken to build a large part of the
HSR network next to highways so as to prevent further land consumption (Be-
ria et al., 2018). Thus, when the route plan is based primarily on geographical
factors (e.g., topography and geomorphology) so as to minimize construction310
costs, the possible endogeneity caused by the non-random location is signifi-
cantly reduced (Faber, 2014; Yu et al., 2018).
Moreover, the decision on where to locate HSR was also driven by the need
to complete the TEN-T corridors, coordinated and co-financed by the European
Union (European Court of Auditors, 2018). Designed initially in the ‘90s (Vick-315
erman et al., 1999), they consist of nine core corridors of road, rail, airport, and
port infrastructure aimed at promoting long-distance and high-speed intermodal
routes across Europe by 2030. All of the Italian HSR network is built along four
of these corridors, which cross the country from north to south and from west
to east: the Scandinavian–Mediterranean corridor, the Mediterranean corridor,320
the Rhine–Alpine corridor, and the Baltic–Adriatic corridor (European Parlia-
ment and Council, 2013). Since TEN-T investments are focused essentially on
achieving faster, more efficient freight transportation, the HSR location can rea-
sonably be assumed to be exogenous with respect to the total km travelled by
light vehicles on the adjacent motorway sectors because our analysis excludes325
heavy vehicles.
3.2. Descriptive statistics
For the period 2001-2017, Figure 2 plots the evolution of the total km trav-
elled by light vehicles on the national tolled motorway network vs. the expan-
sion of HSROpening (Figure 2a) and HSRCompetition (Figure 2b), showing the330
temporal pattern of the treatments that we exploit. After peaking in 2010,
motorway traffic experienced a slump until 2013, coinciding with the maximum
number of km of HS lines in operation. However, over the next 4 years the
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Figure 2: Evolution of the total km travelled by light vehicles on motorway sectors vs. the
expansion of HSROpening and HSRCompetition, 2001-2017
(a) HSROpening (b) HSRCompetition
Figure 3: Evolution of the average number of km travelled by light vehicles on motorway
sectors with and without either HSROpening or HSRCompetition, 2001-2017
(a) HSROpening (b) HSRCompetition
traffic volume recovered its previous level. This pattern suggests that it was the
global economic crisis, rather than the expansion of HSR, that had the greatest335
influence on the fall in motorway traffic. The same explanation applies to Figure
2b, where both the expansion of on-track competition (started in 2012), and the
total km travelled by light vehicles show a parallel increasing trend from 2013
onwards.
Figure 3 plots the evolution of the average number of km travelled by light340
vehicles on two different types of motorway sector: the first includes those
sectors that experienced either an HSR opening on the same route (Figure 3a),
or the opening of on-track competition on the adjacent HS or conventional line
(Figure 3b); the second includes those sectors that experienced neither of the
two phenomena (see Appendix Figures A and B for a map of our treatment345
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and control groups). Even though motorway traffic is, on average, significantly
higher in the treated groups, it is clear how the two trends in both scenarios
follow a very similar path throughout the period of analysis. Graphically, there
is no clear evidence of the possible impact of HSROpening or HSRCompetition
in reducing motorway traffic. Note that the 2013 fall in motorway traffic and350
the subsequent recovery seem more pronounced in the treated groups.
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the variables in Equation 1
(Panel A) and Equation 2 (Panel B), differentiated for the treatment and control
groups previously described. On average, the logarithm of the total km travelled
by light vehicles is found to be larger on motorway sectors that experienced355
either an HSR opening on the same route, or the opening of on-track competition
on the adjacent HS or conventional line. As expected, the average GDP per
capita and the number of passengers carried by domestic flights are higher in the
area surrounding these sectors. In contrast, the average number of light vehicles
per capita is lower for municipalities located within the highway catchment360
area of treated sectors, as is the average revenue per km travelled. Finally, the
average sector length is almost the same for the two groups in Panel A (but it
differs in Panel B), while the average cost of fuel is the same given that it is
calculated at the national level. The table also reports the significance of the
test of difference in mean.365
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Panel A
Mean and Standard deviation
Test of
significance
With HSROpening W/out HSROpening of difference
log(V ehicles−Km) 7.300 (0.740) 6.534 (0.859) ***
HSROpening 0.554 (0.470) 0 (0.000) ***
V ehicles 0.604 (0.052) 0.656 (0.228) **
GDP 30.219 (5.121) 28.367 (5.449) ***
Airport size 7.810 (5.178) 2.356 (3.161) ***
Sector length 103.82 (56.81) 100.94 (58.67)
Toll 6.979 (1.599) 7.963 (3.227) ***
Fuel 128.65 (21.75) 128.65 (21.70)
Panel B
Mean and Standard deviation
Test of
significance
With HSRCompetition W/out HSRCompetition of difference
log(V ehicles−Km) 7.409 (0.747) 6.466 (0.813) ***
HSRCompetition 0.262 (0.422) 0 (0.000) ***
V ehicles 0.606 (0.046) 0.658 (0.234) **
GDP 30.007 (4.427) 28.333 (5.631) ***
Airport size 5.977 (5.160) 2.588 (3.498) ***
Sector length 122.75 (63.87) 95.58 (55.35) ***
Toll 6.904 (1.539) 8.033 (3.280) ***
Fuel 128.65 (21.74) 128.65 (21.70)
Notes: Significance values: ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05.
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4. Results
Tables 2 and 3 report the baseline regression results for Equations 1 and 2,
respectively. Models (1) and (2) are pooled OLS estimations. Models (3) and (4)
add fixed effects to control for all the different time-invariant factors that may
directly affect traffic volumes across motorway sectors. Models (5) and (6) also370
include year dummies to control for the common time trend, such as the impact
of the global economic crisis on motorway traffic. Since it might be argued
that the Toll and Fuel variables may be endogenous with respect to the total
km travelled by light vehicles, Models (1), (3), and (5) seek to show that these
two variables do not affect our results. Indeed, when excluded, the estimated375
coefficients are not significantly different to the values obtained when they are
included. For simplicity, in this section we only discuss the estimates obtained
using Model (6) because it is the most complete specification in relation to our
data, as confirmed by a comparison of R2 values and standard errors.
In Table 2, the coefficient associated with HSROpening shows that HSR380
expansion did not lead to a modal shift from motorway to HSR services, since
it is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. Based on the semi-log
regression interpretation provided by Thornton and Innes (1989), this coefficient
indicates that, holding constant the other variables, a 10% increase in HSR
Table 2: Effect of HSROpening on the total km travelled by light vehicles on motorway sectors
(baseline estimates)
log(V ehicles−Km)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
HSROpening 0.272 0.283 0.089*** 0.086*** 0.054** 0.054**
(0.186) (0.193) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
V ehicles -1.214*** -1.024*** 0.211** 0.160 0.145 0.158
(0.201) (0.263) (0.102) (0.143) (0.088) (0.137)
GDP 0.015 0.016 0.013*** 0.017*** 0.014** 0.013
(0.016) (0.017) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008)
Airport size 0.056*** 0.053*** 0.014 0.014 -0.019** -0.020**
(0.016) (0.016) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008)
Sector length 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Toll -0.028 0.006 -0.002
(0.032) (0.007) (0.007)
Fuel 0.001 -0.000
(0.002) (0.000)
Constant 5.864*** 5.765*** 5.096*** 4.992*** 5.144*** 5.171***
(0.530) (0.646) (0.298) (0.286) (0.348) (0.381)
Motorway sector No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 867 867 867 867 867 867
R2 0.661 0.667 0.402 0.407 0.614 0.614
Notes: All specifications present OLS estimates and include motorway sector and year fixed
effects as indicated. Standard errors clustered at the highway level are in parentheses. Sig-
nificance values: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10.
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length leads, on average, to a 0.55% increase in the total km travelled by light385
vehicles on the adjacent motorway sectors. Thus, our first interpretation is that
the two transport modes are non-competing. As for the relationship between our
control variables and the dependent variable, the V ehicles and GDP coefficients
present the expected sign, given that is reasonable for an increase in both the
number of light vehicles per capita and the average GDP per capita in the390
surrounding area of motorway sectors to produce an increase in traffic volumes.
However, neither value is statistically significant. The coefficient associated with
Airport size suggests that a 1 million increase in the number of passengers
carried by domestic flights leads, on average, to a 1.98% fall in the total km
travelled by light vehicles, meaning that an improvement in the capacity of the395
airline sector may have a positive impact on traffic reduction. The Sector length
variable shows that an additional km of motorway is associated with an average
1.01% increase in the total km travelled by light vehicles. Finally, the Toll
variable is not significant, although its coefficient also presents the expected
sign.400
In Table 3, the coefficient associated with HSRCompetition shows that the
opening of on-track competition between the incumbent Trenitalia and the new
operator NTV did not lead to a modal shift from motorway to HSR services
Table 3: Effect of HSRCompetition on the total km travelled by light vehicles on motorway
sectors (baseline estimates)
log(V ehicles−Km)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
HSRCompetition 0.300* 0.324* 0.070** 0.066** 0.071** 0.071**
(0.170) (0.177) (0.027) (0.028) (0.032) (0.033)
V ehicles -1.213*** -1.016*** 0.202* 0.151 0.155* 0.163
(0.199) (0.263) (0.106) (0.150) (0.087) (0.132)
GDP 0.015 0.016 0.012*** 0.017*** 0.015** 0.014
(0.016) (0.017) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.008)
Airport size 0.060*** 0.057*** 0.022* 0.021* -0.015* -0.015*
(0.015) (0.015) (0.011) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008)
Sector length 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Toll -0.029 0.006 -0.001
(0.032) (0.007) (0.007)
Fuel 0.001 0.000
(0.002) (0.000)
Constant 5.867*** 5.759*** 5.107*** 4.986*** 5.104*** 5.120***
(0.534) (0.644) (0.316) (0.294) (0.350) (0.384)
Motorway sector No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 867 867 867 867 867 867
R2 0.660 0.666 0.389 0.394 0.620 0.621
Notes: All specifications present OLS estimates and include motorway sector and year fixed
effects as indicated. Standard errors clustered at the highway level are in parentheses. Signif-
icance values: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10.
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either. Indeed, the coefficient is still positive and statistically significant at the
5% level. In this case, the coefficient indicates that a 10% increase in the length405
of HS or conventional lines subject to intra-modal competition leads, on average,
to a 0.74% increase in the total km travelled by light vehicles on the adjacent
motorway sectors. Coherent with our previous interpretation, if the two trans-
port modes are non-competing, it is reasonable to expect the HSRCompetition
coefficient to be larger than the HSROpening coefficient because the former cap-410
tures a delayed effect of the earlier treatment. The control variables present very
similar outcomes to those reported above and the same explanations apply.
Thus, the empirical evidence provided by our results, so far, suggests that
the increasing demand for HSR services is not the result of a modal shift from
motorways. In all likelihood, it is the result of induced demand (i.e., the amount415
of new demand originating from travellers that did not travel at all before the
introduction of HSR or who have increased the frequency of their trips thanks
to HSR) and mode substitution from other modes of transport. Yet, the slightly
positive impact of HSR expansion on motorway traffic may have been due, first,
to a positive impact of HSR on surrounding economic activities, which could420
have led to an increase in the total number of car journeys along those routes;
and, second, to a negative impact of HSR on conventional rail services, which
could have led to an unintended increase in car dependency (see Section 6 for a
more detailed discussion).
5. Robustness Checks425
5.1. Parallel trend assumption and timing of the effects
To provide evidence of the reliability of our previous estimates, we need
to check the validity of the specifications. The key assumption is the paral-
lel pre-treatment trend. That is, before treatment, the total km travelled by
light vehicles on motorway sectors that experienced either an HSR opening on430
the same route, or the opening of on-track competition on the adjacent HS or
conventional line, should present no significant differences with respect to the
total km travelled on motorway sectors that experienced neither of these two
events. To verify this assumption, and to investigate the timing of the effects,
we augmented the difference-in-differences regressions with leads and lags before435
and after both treatments. To facilitate visualization, Figure 4 shows the plots
of the lead and lag coefficients with 90% and 95% confidence intervals for our
preferred Model (6) of both Appendix Tables C and D.
The coefficients for the three years before the introduction of both treat-
ments are close to zero and not statistically significant, which verifies the par-440
allel pre-treatment trend assumption. Between the year of HSROpening and
HSRCompetition and the subsequent three years, the coefficients fluctuate be-
tween 0.016-0.039 and 0.029-0.099 log points, respectively; however, they are
still not statistically significant. It is from the fourth year onwards that the
increase in the total km travelled appears as barely significant for the two treat-445
ments, indicating that the HSR expansion took some time to be sufficiently
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Figure 4: Timing of HSROpening and HSRCompetition effects on the total km travelled by
light vehicles on motorway sectors
(a) HSROpening (b) HSRCompetition
Notes: Vertical bands represent ± 1.645 and ± 1.96 times the standard error of each point
estimate.
mature to have an unintended positive impact on traffic volume. Incidentally,
what matters here is that we can exclude any reverse causality issue, as the two
patterns provide robust evidence that it is the HSR expansion that led to an
increase in motorway traffic rather than the other way round.450
5.2. Placebo test
Methodologically, our difference-in-differences estimates rely on the assump-
tion that, in the absence of both HSROpening and HSRCompetition, the differ-
ences in the total km travelled by light vehicles on motorway sectors between
treatment and control groups would have remained constant. To assess the455
validity of this assumption, we perform a falsification test by randomly assign-
ing our treatments to motorway sectors that, in reality, experienced neither
of the two events. If our baseline estimates in Section 4 are correctly reflect-
ing the causal effect of HSR expansion on motorway traffic, we would expect
the placebo estimates to be close to zero. Tables 4 and 5 report the placebo460
regressions. Again, limiting the discussion to Model (6) only, the coefficients
associated with HSROpening and HSRCompetition are close to zero (-0.006 and
-0.004, respectively) and not statistically significant, which verifies the validity
of our identification strategy.
5.3. Stable unit treatment value assumption465
To provide evidence that a possible violation of the stable unit treatment
value assumption (SUTVA) is not affecting our estimates, we need to perform an
additional robustness check. This assumption states that the potential outcome
of one unit should be unaffected by the assignment of the treatment to the
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Table 4: Effect of HSROpening on the total km travelled by light vehicles on motorway sectors
(placebo estimates)
log(V ehicles−Km)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
HSROpening -0.512*** -0.524*** 0.017 0.017 -0.005 -0.006
(0.152) (0.155) (0.041) (0.042) (0.044) (0.042)
V ehicles -1.113*** -0.973*** 0.156 0.096 0.116 0.128
(0.231) (0.289) (0.097) (0.138) (0.080) (0.129)
GDP 0.010 0.012 0.010** 0.016*** 0.013* 0.012
(0.015) (0.016) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0.008)
Airport size 0.064*** 0.061*** 0.016 0.015 -0.019** -0.019**
(0.014) (0.014) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008)
Sector length 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Toll -0.023 0.007 -0.002
(0.033) (0.008) (0.007)
Fuel 0.003* 0.000
(0.002) (0.000)
Constant 6.020*** 5.656*** 5.201*** 5.030*** 5.172*** 5.196***
(0.497) (0.587) (0.331) (0.311) (0.364) (0.394)
Motorway sector No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 867 867 867 867 867 867
R2 0.681 0.686 0.372 0.378 0.603 0.603
Notes: All specifications present OLS estimates and include motorway sector and year fixed
effects as indicated. Standard errors clustered at the highway level are in parentheses. Sig-
nificance values: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10.
other units. In our quasi-experimental setting, this means that the total km470
travelled by light vehicles on each motorway sector should not be influenced by
HSROpening and HSRCompetition on other motorway sectors. This condition
is rarely verified in transport analyses because all routes within a network are
connected to each other.
For instance, if we imagine the HSR network as a hub-and-spoke system,475
surrounding conventional rails (spokes) might act as feeders by linking to the
nodes of the HSR routes (hubs) passengers who need to be connected with long-
haul and faster trains. If this is the case, motorway sectors adjacent to those
conventional rails might experience a reduction in the total km travelled.
To check that this possible phenomenon is not affecting our results, we per-480
form the same analysis as in Section 4 but drop from the dataset all the motor-
way sectors directly connected to the nodes of the HSR routes. By so doing, we
are able to compare the total km travelled by light vehicles on the treated motor-
way sectors with respect to those travelled on a sub-sample of control motorway
sectors that are distant from the treated, for which the hub-and-spoke dynamic485
is not plausible. Tables 6 and 7 report the sub-sample regressions. Again, lim-
iting the discussion to Model (6), the coefficients associated with HSROpening
and HSRCompetition are very close to those of the baseline (0.060 and 0.067,
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Table 5: Effect of HSRCompetition on the total km travelled by light vehicles on motorway
sectors (placebo estimates)
log(V ehicles−Km)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
HSRCompetition -0.409** -0.401** -0.023 -0.034 -0.004 -0.004
(0.155) (0.159) (0.036) (0.039) (0.041) (0.041)
V ehicles -1.161*** -1.030*** 0.180* 0.116 0.115 0.126
(0.220) (0.274) (0.106) (0.150) (0.087) (0.136)
GDP 0.011 0.014 0.007** 0.014*** 0.013* 0.012
(0.016) (0.017) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.008)
Airport size 0.063*** 0.061*** 0.018* 0.017* -0.019** -0.019**
(0.014) (0.015) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008)
Sector length 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Toll -0.022 0.008 -0.002
(0.033) (0.009) (0.007)
Fuel 0.003 0.000
(0.002) (0.000)
Constant 5.976*** 5.681*** 5.238*** 5.055*** 5.173*** 5.196***
(0.532) (0.622) (0.327) (0.307) (0.370) (0.397)
Motorway sector No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 867 867 867 867 867 867
R2 0.665 0.669 0.374 0.382 0.603 0.603
Notes: All specifications present OLS estimates and include motorway sector and year fixed
effects as indicated. Standard errors clustered at the highway level are in parentheses. Signif-
icance values: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10.
respectively) and still positive and statistically significant. These results lend
additional reliability to our previous findings.490
6. Discussion
On the clear understanding that it lies beyond the scope of the current anal-
ysis to draw any general conclusions about HSR programmes, we nevertheless
believe that our empirical evidence can provide a number of insights that are,
moreover, in line with the findings of studies conducted elsewhere.495
The first insight to be gained is that in terms of modal substitution, modes
of transport other than the motorway sector are contributing to the excellent
demand performance of the Italian HSR network, as documented by Beria et al.
(2018). Indeed, the set of studies reviewed by Givoni and Dobruszkes (2013)
show that, in most cases, conventional rail is the main mode of origin for HSR500
passengers, with air transport in second position. Support for these findings
in the Italian scenario is provided by Cascetta et al. (2011), who report that
the majority of HS users on the Rome–Naples link were already train users,
while the percentages of passengers who used the motorway before the HSR
opening were just 7.8% on weekdays, 12.4% on Saturdays, and 14.4% on Sun-505
days. Similarly, Bergantino et al. (2015) and Capozza (2016) shed light on the
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Table 6: Effect of HSROpening on the total km travelled by light vehicles on motorway sectors
(sub-sample estimates)
log(V ehicles−Km)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
HSROpening 0.443** 0.465** 0.095*** 0.094*** 0.060*** 0.060***
(0.173) (0.193) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020)
V ehicles -1.140*** -1.264*** 0.308*** 0.224 0.205** 0.192
(0.214) (0.287) (0.075) (0.188) (0.092) (0.218)
GDP 0.012 0.009 0.016*** 0.018*** 0.016 0.016
(0.019) (0.020) (0.004) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010)
Airport size 0.046** 0.048** 0.011 0.015 -0.016* -0.015
(0.019) (0.020) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Sector length 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Toll 0.021 0.007 0.001
(0.032) (0.011) (0.012)
Fuel -0.003 -0.000
(0.002) (0.000)
Constant 5.848*** 6.205*** 4.766*** 4.764*** 4.859*** 4.852***
(0.597) (0.792) (0.279) (0.257) (0.409) (0.398)
Motorway sector No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 595 595 595 595 595 595
R2 0.690 0.694 0.495 0.502 0.643 0.643
Notes: All specifications present OLS estimates and include motorway sector and year fixed
effects as indicated. Standard errors clustered at the highway level are in parentheses. Sig-
nificance values: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10.
competitive pressure induced by HSR on airline companies operating on Italy’s
national routes. Moreover, induced demand could represent a third source of
HSR passengers. As Cascetta and Coppola (2014, 2015) stress, the contribu-
tion of induced demand to total HSR demand is initially low, but tends to rise510
gradually following the inauguration of the service.
Closely related to this point, the second insight suggests that HSR might
have difficulties in attracting car passengers. Here, if we consider travel time
as the main factor explaining the level of modal shift from motorway to HSR
services, ultimately it is the door-to-door travel time, as opposed to the station-515
to-station travel time, that matters for the mode choice decision. In other words,
access and egress times to/from HSR stations are other determining factors in
the overall journey time (Moyano et al., 2018). It is for this reason that HSR
investments need to be accompanied by improvements in the accessibility of HSR
stations. Furthermore, travelling by car always present advantages in terms of520
schedule (Bilotkach et al., 2010), route choice, cost (as car load factor increases),
and luggage.
Based on the slightly positive impact of HSR expansion on motorway traffic
reported here, the third insight is that HSR may have had a positive effect on
the economic activities of the surrounding area, which could have led to an525
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Table 7: Effect of HSRCompetition on the total km travelled by light vehicles on motorway
sectors (sub-sample estimates)
log(V ehicles−Km)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
HSRCompetition 0.414** 0.429** 0.068*** 0.064** 0.067** 0.067**
(0.153) (0.171) (0.021) (0.023) (0.026) (0.026)
V ehicles -1.193*** -1.168*** 0.292*** 0.212 0.220*** 0.216
(0.191) (0.261) (0.070) (0.194) (0.076) (0.199)
GDP 0.020 0.020 0.014*** 0.016*** 0.016 0.016
(0.021) (0.022) (0.004) (0.005) (0.010) (0.010)
Airport size 0.035** 0.035** 0.024** 0.027*** -0.008 -0.008
(0.014) (0.014) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009)
Sector length 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Toll -0.003 0.007 0.000
(0.032) (0.011) (0.012)
Fuel -0.000 -0.000
(0.002) (0.000)
Constant 5.662*** 5.720*** 4.689*** 4.676*** 4.720*** 4.718***
(0.648) (0.827) (0.415) (0.365) (0.546) (0.519)
Motorway sector No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 612 612 612 612 612 612
R2 0.701 0.702 0.451 0.457 0.635 0.635
Notes: All specifications present OLS estimates and include motorway sector and year fixed
effects as indicated. Standard errors clustered at the highway level are in parentheses. Signif-
icance values: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10.
increase in the total number of car journeys on these routes. Indeed, although
both transport modes connect the same city-pairs, HSR is concerned more with
attracting the “primary” traffic between a route’s nodes (i.e., the largest cities),
while motorways connect the “secondary” traffic between all the exits along a
route. As such, the two transport modes may interact in a complementary530
rather than competitive dynamic.
Finally, the last insight to be gained is that HSR development could lead to
an unintended increase in car dependency, because while HSR expansion might
attract car passengers, it may, at the same time, undermine conventional rail
services. In other words, the reduction in demand for conventional rail services535
(due to the modal shift toward HSR services) may induce rail operators to cut
investments in the conventional network. In turn, this deterioration in conven-
tional rail services, combined with a reduction in their frequency of service, may
induce passengers to opt for different modes of transport. For instance, the mat-
uration of the HSR network and the entry of NTV increased the supply of fully540
high-speed services aimed at reducing travel time between city-pairs. These
long-distance services, operated by Frecciarossa and Italo trains on dedicated
tracks only, may have reduced commuting opportunities between intermediate
stops, since the accessibility (and cost) of fully high-speed services cannot match
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that of mixed high-speed or conventional services. As a result, HSR expansion545
may lead to a reduction in rail connectivity for people living along the routes
on which HSR has been implemented, and to an unintended increase in car
dependency. This view is also supported by Sa´nchez-Mateos and Givoni (2012).
As highlighted by De Rus and Nombela (2007) and Beria and Grimaldi
(2011), this opens up the debate as to whether the mobility needs of broad550
metropolitan areas (such as those found in Italy), where medium-sized towns
are located at relatively short distances from each other, should rely more on a
fully mixed high-speed model rather than on a model that satisfies the “need
for speed” of long-haul routes. It should be borne in mind that a policy that
promotes rail use at the expense of the car should carefully analyse the impact555
of HS on conventional rail services. This is a relationship that shall we seek
to understand in future research. Moreover, once freight trains start using the
new HS lines, we shall test whether the HSR expansion leads to a modal shift
of freight from motorways to HSR services.
7. Conclusions560
The development of HSR has transformed modal market shares on the routes
on which it has been implemented both by generating new demand and by
replacing the demand for other modes of transport.
To date, most previous studies have focused on the inter-modal competition
between air and rail and on the intra-modal competition between rail opera-565
tors, while the literature examining competition between car and rail is scant.
However, because the reduction in road traffic (and its negative environmental
impact) is one of the key drivers offsetting HSR investments, our study has
sought to analyse whether the HSR expansion in Italy has led to a modal shift
from its motorways to HSR services.570
We have empirically tested, first, whether HSR openings adjacent to some
motorway sectors have reduced the total km travelled by light vehicles on these
sectors during the period 2001-2017; and, second, whether this reduction has
been persistent or even more evident after the opening of on-track competition
on some adjacent HS and conventional lines between the incumbent Trenitalia575
and the new operator NTV, which entered the HS passenger market in 2012.
In so doing, we carried out a generalized difference-in-differences estimation
using a unique 17-year panel dataset. This has enabled us to control for many
unobservable confounding factors and to exploit the heterogeneous traffic data
within all tolled motorway sectors in a quasi-experimental setting.580
Our findings reveal that neither HSR openings nor the opening of on-track
competition led to a modal shift from motorway to HSR services, as the two
transport modes are non-competing. Conversely, both phenomena had a slightly
positive impact on motorway traffic. Indeed, a 10% increase in both the HSR
length and in the length of HS or conventional lines subject to intra-modal585
competition lead, on average, to a 0.55% and to a 0.74% increase, respectively,
in the total km travelled by light vehicles on the adjacent motorway sectors.
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Figure A: HSROpening expansion in Italy up to 2017
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on AISCAT (2017)
Notes: The excluded motorway sectors are the toll-free sectors managed by ANAS, as
explained in Section 2.1, and the sectors described in Section 3.1.
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Figure B: HSRCompetition expansion in Italy up to 2017
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on AISCAT (2017)
Notes: The excluded motorway sectors are the toll-free sectors managed by ANAS, as
explained in Section 2.1, and the sectors described in Section 3.1.
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Table C: Effect of HSROpening on the total km travelled by light vehicles on motorway sectors
(lead and lag estimates)
log(V ehicles−Km)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
3 years before 0.229 0.214 0.046*** 0.043*** -0.000 -0.000
(0.242) (0.230) (0.012) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009)
2 years before 0.214 0.194 0.066*** 0.061*** 0.007 0.007
(0.255) (0.246) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012)
1 year before 0.255 0.230 0.089*** 0.085*** 0.013 0.013
(0.255) (0.253) (0.012) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016)
year of HSROpening 0.275 0.255 0.111*** 0.108*** 0.015 0.016
(0.257) (0.256) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.019)
1 year after 0.242 0.217 0.103*** 0.099*** 0.018 0.018
(0.266) (0.270) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
2 years after 0.207 0.171 0.066*** 0.065*** -0.007 -0.007
(0.245) (0.257) (0.021) (0.020) (0.031) (0.031)
3 years after 0.253 0.237 0.115** 0.116** 0.038 0.039
(0.234) (0.239) (0.045) (0.045) (0.027) (0.026)
4 or more years after 0.179 0.192 0.149*** 0.144*** 0.086* 0.086*
(0.276) (0.292) (0.048) (0.048) (0.046) (0.047)
V ehicles -1.220*** -1.043*** 0.221** 0.172 0.155* 0.165
(0.206) (0.269) (0.098) (0.140) (0.086) (0.133)
GDP 0.014 0.016 0.013*** 0.017*** 0.016** 0.015*
(0.017) (0.018) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.008)
Airport size 0.057*** 0.054*** 0.015 0.015 -0.016* -0.016*
(0.017) (0.017) (0.011) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008)
Sector length 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Toll -0.027 0.006 -0.001
(0.032) (0.007) (0.007)
Fuel 0.002 -0.000
(0.002) (0.000)
Constant 5.896*** 5.731*** 5.091*** 5.001*** 5.085*** 5.107***
(0.547) (0.656) (0.303) (0.279) (0.354) (0.388)
Motorway sector No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 867 867 867 867 867 867
R2 0.658 0.663 0.406 0.410 0.618 0.618
Notes: All specifications present OLS estimates and include motorway sector and year fixed effects
as indicated. Standard errors clustered at the highway level are in parentheses. Significance values:
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10.
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Table D: Effect of HSRCompetition on the total km travelled by light vehicles on motorway
sectors (lead and lag estimates)
log(V ehicles−Km)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
3 years before 0.582* 0.574* 0.116*** 0.129*** -0.005 -0.005
(0.340) (0.330) (0.026) (0.024) (0.026) (0.026)
2 years before 0.590* 0.577 0.142*** 0.148*** 0.039 0.039
(0.347) (0.350) (0.030) (0.029) (0.027) (0.028)
1 year before 0.532 0.498 0.101*** 0.098*** 0.039 0.039
(0.348) (0.365) (0.032) (0.033) (0.029) (0.030)
year of HSRCompetition 0.463 0.389 0.013 0.012 0.029 0.029
(0.348) (0.377) (0.033) (0.038) (0.035) (0.036)
1 year after 0.490 0.440 0.025 0.026 0.031 0.030
(0.355) (0.379) (0.035) (0.038) (0.039) (0.042)
2 years after 0.279 0.263 0.039 0.038 0.060* 0.060*
(0.372) (0.398) (0.032) (0.032) (0.035) (0.035)
3 years after 0.365 0.405 0.135* 0.136* 0.099 0.099
(0.393) (0.408) (0.067) (0.067) (0.070) (0.073)
4 or more years after 0.452 0.511 0.214*** 0.207*** 0.128* 0.127*
(0.388) (0.402) (0.069) (0.070) (0.070) (0.072)
V ehicles -1.223*** -1.042*** 0.197* 0.144 0.142 0.145
(0.203) (0.267) (0.110) (0.153) (0.095) (0.142)
GDP 0.015 0.017 0.012*** 0.019*** 0.016** 0.015*
(0.017) (0.017) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.009)
Airport size 0.058*** 0.055*** 0.018 0.015 -0.017** -0.017**
(0.015) (0.016) (0.011) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008)
Sector length 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Toll -0.027 0.006 -0.000
(0.032) (0.007) (0.008)
Fuel 0.002 0.000
(0.002) (0.000)
Constant 5.879*** 5.746*** 5.113*** 4.923*** 5.080*** 5.087***
(0.537) (0.650) (0.323) (0.310) (0.368) (0.410)
Motorway sector No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 867 867 867 867 867 867
R2 0.660 0.665 0.399 0.405 0.611 0.611
Notes: All specifications present OLS estimates and include motorway sector and year fixed effects
as indicated. Standard errors clustered at the highway level are in parentheses. Significance values:
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10.
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